

Warning:

- This is an online open book exam. This implies that in the assessment the following two points will be taken into consideration:
 1. In your answer to questions involving analytical derivations, please start with a **very short explanation** of your reasoning.
 2. Your answer should be concise, objective and specific. Any notation, calculation, motivation, discussion or explanation **not strictly related to the specific question** it tries to address will either not be considered or have a negative assessment.
- **Points:** 1(a) - 2, 1(b) - 2, 1(c) - 1, 2(a) - 0.5, 2(b) - 3, and 2(c) - 1.5.
- Your exam will only be considered if it is uploaded in Aquila between 20:05 and 20:10.

- 1 Consider a two-period intertemporal utility function, in a deterministic setting, for the consumption sequence $\{c_0, c_1\}$

$$U(c_0, c_1) = \left((1 - \mu) c_0^\eta + \mu c_1^\eta \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}$$

for $0 < \mu < 1$ and $\eta \in (-\infty, \infty)$.

- (a) After determining the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, the Allen-Uzawa elasticities, and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, characterize the possible types of behavior and their dependence on the parameters μ and η .
 - (b) Assume a representative-agent Arrow-Debreu (AD) endowment economy, where the flow of endowment is $\{y_0, (1 + \gamma) y_0\}$ and the price of AD contracts is denoted by q . Solve the representative agent problem. Discuss the response of the optimal consumption c_0 from changes in q .
 - (c) Find the equilibrium AD price. Provide an intuition. In particular, discuss the relationship between the behavioral features you discussed in (a) and the equilibrium AD price (tip: observe that q is a discount factor, which means that $1/q = 1 + r$ where r can be interpreted as the risk-free interest rate for this economy).
- 2 Consider a two-period intertemporal utility function, in a stochastic setting, for the consumption sequence $\{c_0, C_1\}$ where $C_1 = (c_{11}, \dots, c_{1s}, \dots, c_{1n})$

$$U(c_0, C_1) = \left((1 - \mu) c_0^\eta + \mu \mathbb{C}\mathbb{E}[C_1]^\eta \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}$$

for $0 < \mu < 1$ and $\eta \in (-\infty, \infty)$, where $\mathbb{C}\mathbb{E}[C_1]$ is the certainty equivalent of $\mathbb{E}[\ln(C_1)]$.

- (a) Discuss the existence of risk aversion (Tip: compare $\mathbb{C}\mathbb{E}[C_1]$ with $\mathbb{E}[C_1]$ for the cases in which C_1 is state independent and or it is state-dependent).

- (b) Assume a representative-agent Arrow-Debreu (AD) endowment economy, where the flow of endowment is $\{y_0, (1 + \Gamma) y_0\}$, where $\Gamma = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n)$ is state-dependent. Solve the representative agent problem. Discuss the response of the optimal consumption c_0 to changes in q_s .
- (c) Find the equilibrium stochastic discount factor, M^* . Find the covariance between M^* and $1 + \Gamma$. Which signs this covariance can display? Do they depend on the behavioral parameters of the model?