

Asset prices and financial frictions

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Advanced Macroeconomics (PhD in Economics): 2022-2023

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6.12.2022

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1 Introduction

This note deals with general stochastic general equilibrium models in continuous time. In particular, we deal with macroeconomic finance variables as interest rates, asset prices, net wealth, and leverage, with a view of dealing with macroeconomic fluctuations. The two major dimensions of the analysis are related to the source of uncertainty and to the way it is propagated in the economy.

First, we assume there are aggregate stochastic shocks which hit the economy frequently. That is, we will not deal with rare big shocks, driven by jump processes, but with continuous, small, and imperfectly observed random perturbations driven by Itô processes affecting the fundamentals of the economy. The two branches of financial economics, financial microeconomics and macroeconomics, can be distinguished by the type of risk they tend to address. While microfinance deals mainly with idiosyncratic risk, and the insurance or sharing mechanisms provided by asset markets, macrofinance is more concerned with the existence of aggregate risk and the way it is absorbed, shared, amplified or smoothed out by the operating of asset markets. In this note we will assume there is an exogenous source of risk which is introduced through supply shocks taking the form of dividend or productivity random changes.

Second, the propagation of shocks may depend on the existence of frictions in the economy. We take as a benchmark a frictionless, representative agent, endowment economy (see section 2) and introduce progressively several frictions. In the literature followed in this note, there are frictions if there is some type of heterogeneity among agents. Heterogeneity can be introduced through differences in preferences, participation in financial markets, rates of return on assets, information, for instance. In this note we consider only one type of friction: limited participation in section 3. We will study the distortions introduced by this type of friction in a benchmark exchange economy and in a production economy in which there are costs of adjustment of capital (in section 4). Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) call this case technological illiquidity. We will see that, in some cases, asset returns are not independent of the wealth distribution among heterogeneous agents.

The objective of this note is mainly pedagogical to make accessible some relevant recent research, by providing some detail on the construction of the models and on the way they are related. We will focus on the following papers: Basak and Cuoco (1998), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and the survey Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016).

In section 2 we present the benchmark frictionless economy. In 3 we present a model with limited asset market participation and in section 4 a model with adjustment costs in investment.

2 Frictionless economies

2.1 Primitives: preferences and endowments

The general equilibrium for a stochastic dynamic economy requires introducing assumptions regarding four elements: information environment, technology available, preference structure, and existing market institutions. Next, we specify those elements for the simplest economies: the endowment or exchange economies.

Information The information structure is specified by a the filtered probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{F}, P)$ where Ω is the space of admissible realizations, \mathcal{F} is the set of all events belonging to the space Ω , and the filtration, $\mathbb{F} = (\mathcal{F}(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$, is a flow of non-anticipating events such that $\mathcal{F}(s) \subset \mathcal{F}(t)$, for $s < t$, and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathcal{F}(t) = \mathcal{F}$. In our case, the filtration is generated by a standard Wiener process, which implies that, associated to the filtration, there is a flow of unconditional probabilities $(P(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$, where $P(t) = P(t, \omega(t))$ is the probability of occurrence of state $\omega = \omega(t)$ at time t , such that the process is Markovian and the conditional probability satisfies $P(t + dt, \omega') - P(t, \omega) \sim N(0, dt)$, where $N(0, dt)$ is the Gaussian distribution with zero mean and standard deviation equal to dt . This information structure is common knowledge to every agent.

The flow of consumption and endowments, $C = (C(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}}$ and $Y = (Y(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}}$, are adapted stochastic processes to the filtration \mathbb{F} . This means that upper-case letters, $C(t)$ and $Y(t)$, denote (ex-ante) \mathcal{F}_t -measurable random variables for every $t \in (0, \infty)$. Ex-post realizations of those processes are denoted by lower-case letters, that is $C(t) = c(t)$ and $Y(t) = y(t)$ denote the realizations of the consumption and endowment processes at time t , respectively.

Resources There is only one good in the economy that can be supplied in one of the following two types of frameworks: endowment or production economies. In the first type of economy, the aggregate supply of the good is exogenous and it is assumed to be driven by a known stochastic process. However, the realizations of this process over time are not perfectly observed by agents.

In a production economy there would be a decision on the level of input but the source of uncertainty (productivity or dividend shocks) is driven by a time-varying exogenous shock, not perfectly observed by producers. In the final sections, we will consider cases in which there are some production and investment decisions for firms.

In our endowment economy, the output is driven by the diffusion equation (a linear stochastic differential equation (SDE)) such a

$$\begin{cases} \frac{dY(t)}{Y(t)} = gdt + \sigma dW(t), & \text{for } t > 0 \\ Y(0) = y_0 \text{ given} & \text{for } t = 0 \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where, we assume for simplicity that the drift, g , and the volatility, σ , coefficients are constant and known. The initial value of the endowment $Y(0) = y_0$ is also known. Therefore, the sample paths of the endowment have the following statistics

$$\mathbb{E}[Y(t)] = y_0 e^{gt}, \quad \mathbb{V}[Y(t)] = y_0^2 e^{2gt} (e^{\sigma^2 t} - 1),$$

meaning that: if $g > 0$ then $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[Y(t)] = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{V}[Y(t)] = \infty$, and the endowment is both non-stationary and displays increasing volatility; or, if $g = 0$, then $\mathbb{E}[Y(t)] = y_0$ for each $t \in [0, \infty)$ but $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{V}[Y(t)] = \infty$ (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Fundamentals: endowment dynamics for $g > 0$

Preferences The representative household preferences are represented by the utility functional, displaying additive preferences,

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty u(C(t)) e^{-\rho t} dt \right] \tag{2}$$

where $\rho > 0$ is the rate of time preference and $u(\cdot)$ is the instantaneous utility function, satisfying $u'(\cdot) > 0$, $u''(\cdot) < 0$ and $u'''(\cdot) > 0$. For any realization of the consumption process at time t ,

$C(t) = c > 0$ ¹ we define the **coefficients of relative risk aversion** and of **relative prudence** by

$$r_r(c) \equiv -\frac{u''(c)c}{u'(c)}, \quad \pi_r(c) \equiv -\frac{u'''(c)c}{u''(c)}.$$

If $r_r(u) > 0$ the utility function displays risk aversion and if $r_r(u) = 0$ it displays risk neutrality. In order to be able to derive clear results, and because this is the utility function most commonly used in the literature, we assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, for evaluating every realization of the consumption process, $C(t) = c$

$$u(c) = \begin{cases} \frac{c^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma}, & \text{if } \gamma \neq 1 \\ \ln(c), & \text{if } \gamma = 1 \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

Because,

$$r_r(u) = \gamma, \quad \text{and } \pi_r(u) = 1 + \gamma.$$

the utility function displays risk aversion if $\gamma > 0$ and risk neutrality if $\gamma = 0$. If $\gamma = 1$ the utility function is logarithmic and it is a special case of low risk aversion.

Observe that given the information structure the unconditional expected value is

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty u(C(t))e^{-\rho t} dt \right] = \int_0^\infty \int_{\mathcal{F}(t)} u(C(t, \omega(t)))e^{-\rho t} dP(t, \omega(t)) dt.$$

Asset markets The institutional structure, that is, the structure of markets, determines the type of contracts available to the household and, therefore, the way households allocate their resources between states of nature (insurance) or over time (savings and investments).

We consider next **two market structures**, and, therefore, two economies: an **Arrow-Debreu economy** and a frictionless **finance economy** in which there is one riskfree asset (in zero net supply) and a risky asset. In both economies, the household is constrained in its allocations by an intertemporal budget constraint, which is explicit in the Arrow-Debreu economy and is implicit in the finance economy if a non-Ponzi game condition is introduced. In the finance economy there is an instantaneous budget constraint, because agents trade continuously in the asset markets.

We will prove that the equilibrium allocations are equivalent in those two economies, in the absence of frictions. This provides a benchmark to compare equilibrium allocations and prices for finance economies with frictions.

¹Except for the case of rates of return, uppercase letters refer to random variables (i.e, a multivalued function), and lowercase letters refer to realizations (i.e, a number). Therefore, these coefficients refers to the value of every realization of consumption, for any time. or state of nature.

2.2 An Arrow-Debreu endowment economy

The **Arrow-Debreu's economy**² is fundamentally characterized by the existence of a market setting in which there are (real) intertemporal contingent contracts over the good. It is assumed that there is a large (in fact infinite) number of contingent claim markets, operating at time $t = 0$, in which agents can contract for delivery of one unit of the good, at any future moment and state of nature. An agent can contract to be delivered (to deliver) one unit of the good at time t , at a particular state of nature $\omega(t)$, thus paying (receiving) a price at time $t = 0$. Therefore, a system of Arrow-Debreu contracts provide a huge (mutual) insurance market covering consumption for every future event by means of forward contract.

The price of an Arrow-Debreu contract for delivery at $(t, \omega(t))$, is denoted by $Q(t, \omega(t))$. It is a \mathcal{F}_t -measurable random variable, and the price for the spot contract satisfies $Q(0) = 1$.

We assume a **homogeneous agent endowment economy** in which the representative agent faces the following constraint for its transactions in all the forward markets open at time $t = 0$,

$$\int_0^\infty \int_{\mathcal{F}(t)} (Y(t, \omega) - C(t, \omega)) dQ(t, \omega) dt = 0.$$

If we define the **stochastic discount factor** as the \mathcal{F}_t -adapted process $(M(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ such that $dQ(t, \omega) = M(t, \omega) dP(t, \omega)$, then the budget constraint can be equivalently written as the unconditional expected (that is, with information available at time $t = 0$) present value of the discounted excess supply of the good in all times and states of nature

$$E_0 \left[\int_0^\infty M(t)(Y(t) - C(t)) dt \right] = 0 \quad (4)$$

where $M(0) = 1$.

The **representative household problem** is to maximize the functional (2) subject to the budget constraint (4)

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{C(\cdot)} E_0 \left[\int_0^\infty u(C(t)) e^{-\rho t} dt \right] \\ \text{subject to} \\ E_0 \left[\int_0^\infty M(t)(Y(t) - C(t)) dt \right] = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

given the endowment and the AD-price processes, $(Y(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ and $(Q(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$.³

²This is a continuous time version of the Lucas (1978) model.

³There are some technical conditions on the processes M , Y and C which basically amount to the guarantee of boundedness: they should be class \mathcal{H} functions, that is with bounded variance in finite time.

Definition 1. An **Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium** (also called a simultaneous market equilibrium), for an aggregate risk given by $(W(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$, is defined by the processes for consumption, $(C^{eq}(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$, and for the stochastic discount factor (SDF) $(M^{eq}(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$, given the flow of the endowment $(Y(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$, such that:

1. the representative household solves its problem (5), that is, it maximizes the utility functional (2) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (4), given the SDF and endowment processes,
2. markets clear at every time and state of nature, that is $C(t) = Y(t)$ at every time and state of nature.

Finding the DSGE means finding (or at least characterizing) the processes $(C(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ and $(M(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$.

Finding the equilibrium process for consumption The representative agent assumption implies that the equilibrium process for consumption is very easy to find, from the goods market equilibrium condition together with the assumption we have an endowment economy:

$$C^{eq}(t) = Y(t), \text{ for every } t \in \mathbb{R}_+. \quad (6)$$

Therefore $dC^{eq}(t) = dY(t)$, and from equation (1)

$$dC^{eq}(t) = C^{eq}(t) (gdt + \sigma dW(t)), \quad t \geq 0.$$

consumption is perfectly correlated with the endowment. Then, as

$$\mathbb{E}[C^{eq}(t)] = y_0 e^{gt}, \text{ for every } t \in \mathbb{R}_+,$$

equilibrium consumption is non-stationary in average if $g > 0$ and is stationary in average if $g = 0$. Furthermore, as

$$\mathbb{V}[C(t)] = y_0^2 e^{gt} \left(e^{\sigma^2 t} - 1 \right),$$

the variance increases in time even in the case in which $g = 0$, if $\sigma > 0$.

Figure 1 depicts sample paths for the non-stationary case.

Finding the equilibrium stochastic discount factor At the equilibrium, the **stochastic discount factor** (see the appendix A) is the \mathcal{F}_t adapted stochastic process

$$M^{eq}(t) = e^{-\rho t} \frac{u'(Y(t))}{u'(y_0)}, \text{ for each } t \in \mathbb{R}_+. \quad (7)$$

Writing $M(t) u'(y_0) = e^{-\rho t} u'(Y(t))$ we see that $M(t)$ is the reciprocal of a **market** intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between the initial time $t = 0$ and any future time $t > 0$. The MRS is

the sacrifice of consumption today, at $t = 0$, to get a unit increase in consumption in a future date $t > 0$. It depends on the rate of time preference, on the utility function and the stochastic process governing the availability of the endowment.

The flow $(M^{eq}(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ is adapted stochastic process generated by the endowment process. Using Itô's lemma (see Appendix A) we find that the equilibrium stochastic discount factor also follows a diffusion process

$$\frac{dM^{eq}(t)}{M^{eq}(t)} = -(\mu_m(t)dt + \sigma_m(t)dW(t)) \quad (8)$$

where the drift and the volatility are

$$\mu_m(t) = \rho + r_r(Y(t)) \left(g - \frac{1}{2} \pi_r(Y(t)) \sigma^2 \right) \quad (9)$$

$$\sigma_m(t) = r_r(Y(t)) \sigma \quad (10)$$

where $r_r(y)$ and $\pi_r(y)$ are the coefficients of relative risk aversion and the coefficient of prudence associated to the utility function $u(\cdot)$.

Therefore, the stochastic discount factor (SDF) is governed by a backward diffusion process in which:

- the diffusion coefficient has two terms: the first is the rate of time preference and the second depends on the dynamic properties of the endowment and on the behavior towards risk. The diffusion term increases with the average rate of growth and decreases with the volatility coefficient of the endowment process, $Y(t)$;
- the volatility coefficient is proportional to the volatility of the endowment process.
- the transmission of the growth and volatility of the endowment to the SDF is proportional to the relative risk aversion coefficient.

2.2.1 CRRA utility function

The constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function is particularly convenient because it is characterized by constant coefficients of relative risk aversion and prudence, which result from its homogeneity property. In this case, the SDF process has a constant drift coefficient

$$\mu_m = \begin{cases} \rho + \gamma \left(g - \frac{1 + \gamma}{2} \sigma^2 \right), & \text{if } \gamma \neq 1 \\ \rho + g - \sigma^2, & \text{if } \gamma = 1 \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

and a constant volatility coefficient

$$\sigma_m = \begin{cases} \gamma \sigma, & \text{if } \gamma \neq 1 \\ \sigma, & \text{if } \gamma = 1. \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

We see that μ_m increases with ρ and g , decreases with σ and has an ambiguous sign for γ , and σ_m increases with γ and σ . Therefore, the degree of risk aversion parameter, γ influences μ_m in qualitative way and influences σ_m only quantitatively.

We have the following possibilities.

First, If there is risk neutrality, that is, if $\gamma = 0$, then $\mu_m = \rho$ and $\sigma_m = 0$, and

$$\mathbb{E}[M(t)] = e^{-\rho t}, \quad \mathbb{V}[M(t)] = 0,$$

which means that the stochastic discount factor is deterministic and is, on average, equal to the (psychological) discount factor. Then the SDF is deterministic; Second, if there is risk aversion, that is if $\gamma > 0$, then the SDF is a diffusion process with a constant drift and volatility coefficients, given by (11) and (12). Therefore, the statistics for M ⁴ are

$$\mathbb{E}[M(t)] = e^{-\mu_m t}, \quad \mathbb{V}[M(t)] = e^{-2\mu_m t} \left(e^{\sigma_m^2 t - 1} \right).$$

In this case, the distributional dynamic properties of the stochastic discount factor depend on the relationship between the parameters of the model, the rate of time preference, the rate of growth of the endowment, and, in particular on the magnitude of the risk aversion parameter γ . While $\sigma_m > 0$, the sign of μ_m is ambiguous. If $\mu_m < 0$ we say there are **bubbles** and if $\mu_m \geq 0$ **bubbles are ruled out**.

There is a critical value of the degree of risk aversion $\gamma_c = \{\gamma > 0 : \mu_m(\gamma) = 0\}$, that separates the cases in which there are no bubbles from the cases in which there are bubbles. Solving $\mu_m(\gamma) = 0$, we find a value for the coefficient of risk aversion γ ,

$$\gamma_c = \frac{g}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2} + \left[\left(\frac{g}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2} \right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2} \right]^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

such that:

- if risk-aversion is low, such that $0 \leq \gamma < \gamma_c$ then $\mu_m > 0$. This implies

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[M(t)] = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{V}[M(t)] = +\infty$$

and the SDF is non-stationary (there are bubbles);

- if risk aversion is high such that $\gamma > \gamma_c$ then $\mu_m < 0$ which implies the SDF is stationary and the $M(t)$ converges to zero

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[M(t)] = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{V}[M(t)] = 0$$

⁴We use the results in https://pmbrito.github.io/cursos/phd/ame/ame2223/ame2223_lecture6.pdf.

- if $\gamma = \gamma_c$ then $\mu_m = 0$ and

$$\mathbb{E}[M(t)] = 1, \text{ for all } t \in [0, \infty), \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{V}[M(t)] = \infty$$

the process for M is stationary in average but the volatility increases unboundedly.

There is a necessary condition for ruling out bubbles: $\frac{\sigma^2}{2} > g$.

We see that bubbles can occur if the growth rate of the endowment is too large, is volatility of the endowment is not large enough, or if the coefficient of risk aversion is too small.




Figure 2: Stochastic discount factor for the no-bubble case

2.2.2 Consumption and the stochastic discount factor

We can determine the covariance between consumption and the stochastic discount factor

$$\text{Cov}[C(t), M(t)] = y_0 e^{(\rho + (1+\gamma)(g - \frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma^2))t} (e^{\gamma\sigma^2 t} - 1).$$

This means that consumption and the stochastic discount factor are negatively correlated:

$$\text{Corr}[C, M(t)] = \frac{e^{-\gamma\sigma^2 t} - 1}{\sqrt{(e^{\gamma\sigma^2 t} - 1)(e^{\sigma^2 t} - 1)}} < 0$$

2.2.3 Characterization of the DSGE

We conclude that, at the equilibrium: (1) consumption is perfectly correlated with the endowment; (2) consumption and the stochastic discount factor are negatively correlated. The distributional dynamics of consumption inherits those of the endowment.

Furthermore, the stochastic discount factor can be positively or negatively correlated with the endowment. In the first case we say there are bubbles and in the second we say there are no bubbles.

2.3 Finance economy

2.3.1 Asset returns

In a finance economy the intertemporal allocation of resources is done by trading in spot asset markets that operate at every point in time. In the present continuous time framework, markets are continuously open and trade is continuous. This allows for continuous changes in the allocations of consumption relative to resources, over time and across states of nature, in alternative to trading in forward market only at time $t = 0$, as in the Arrow-Debreu economy.

We assume that there are **two assets**, one risk free and one risky asset, and therefore there are two asset markets. While the risky asset is in positive aggregate net supply, the risk free is in aggregate zero net supply. We consider a representative household economy in which the representative agent can have long or short positions in every asset, that is, it can be a borrower or a lender.

The risk free asset price, at time t , is denoted by $B(t)$, and follows the deterministic process

$$dB(t) = r(t) B(t) dt,$$

where $r(t)$ is the risk-free interest rate. The return is $R(t) = \int_0^t r(s) ds$, and follows the deterministic process $dR(t) = r(t) dt$. The interest rate $r(\cdot)$ is exogenous to the household level, that is, households are price takers. However, the interest rate is endogenous at the aggregate because we are assuming a closed economy. Therefore, its general equilibrium level is endogenous.

The risky asset has the price, at time t , denoted by $S(t)$, and it entitles to (or generates a liability of) a gain process $G(t) = S(t) + \int_0^t D(s) ds$, where D is the dividend. We assume that the dividend is exogenous and follows a diffusion process

$$\frac{dD(t)}{D(t)} = g dt + \sigma dW(t). \quad (13)$$

This dividend process corresponds to the **fundamentals** for this economy, as the endowment process was to the AD economy. To make the general equilibrium of the two economies comparable, we introduce the same parameters for the drift and the volatility components of the dividend process as we did for the parameters of the endowment process in the Arrow-Debreu economy.

The **price-dividend ratio** relates the asset price with the dividend through the equation

$$S(t) = q(t)D(t).$$

Although the change in market price of the risky asset is endogenous, we **conjecture** that it follows the linear diffusion process

$$\frac{dS(t)}{S(t)} = \mu_s(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)dW(t),$$

where μ_s and σ_s , if this conjecture is right, can be determined in equilibrium as a function of fundamentals. If this is the case, the return for holding the risky asset is also endogenous and follows the process

$$dG(t) = S(t)\left(\tilde{\mu}_s(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)dW(t)\right), \quad (14)$$

where the instantaneous rate of return for the risky asset is⁵

$$\tilde{\mu}_s(t) = \mu_s(t) + \frac{1}{q(t)}.$$

In the literature the excess return of the risky asset as regards the risk free asset, also called risk premium, normalized by the standard deviation of the risky asset is called the **Sharpe ratio**

$$X(t) = \frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)}.$$

2.3.2 Households' problem

The households net wealth is invested in risk free and risky assets. Denoting net wealth, at time t , by $N(t)$, we have $N(t) = B(t) + S(t)$. If the share of the risky asset is denoted by $w(t) \equiv S(t)/N(t)$, then the households' budget constraint is

$$dN(t) = N(t)\left((1 - w(t))r(t)dt + w(t)(\tilde{\mu}_s(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)dW(t))\right) - C(t)dt \quad (15)$$

⁵To prove this, we differentiating the gain yields

$$dG(t) = dS(t) + \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\left(\int_0^t D(s)ds\right)dt = dS(t) + D(t)dt = S(t)\left(\mu_s(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)dW(t)\right) + \frac{S(t)}{q(t)}dt.$$

where we assume that wealth at the initial time is observed (deterministic) $N(0) = n_0$.

As the risky asset is in positive aggregate net supply, we will have $w(t) > 0$, and because agents can take long or short positions in the risk-free asset, $w(t)$ has a free upper bound. If agents leverage their position on the risky asset by risk-free borrowing then $w(t) > 1$. If agents cannot take short positions on the risk-free asset then $w(t)$ would be constrained to be smaller than one.

The household's problem is

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{C(\cdot), w(\cdot)} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty u(C(t)) e^{-\rho t} dt \right] \\ & \text{subject to} \\ & dN(t) = N(t) \left((1 - w(t)) r(t) dt + w(t) (\tilde{\mu}_s(t) dt + \sigma_s(t) dW(t)) \right) - C(t) dt \\ & N(0) = n_0 \text{ given.} \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

We assume that households are homogenous as regards preferences, information, and initial wealth.

2.3.3 DSGE for a finance economy

Definition 2. General equilibrium for an unconstrained finance economy It is the allocations $(C^{eq}(t), B^{eq}(t), S^{eq}(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ and the returns $(R^{eq}(t), G^{eq}(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ such that, given the aggregate risk process $(W(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ and the dividend process $(D(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$:

1. the representative household solves its problem, that is, it maximizes the utility functional (2) subject to the instantaneous budget constraint (15), given the assets' rates of return processes;
2. markets clear: $C^{eq}(t) = D(t)$, $B^{eq}(t) = 0$, and $S^{eq}(t) = N^{eq}(t)$, at every time and state of nature.

2.3.4 Characterizing the DSGE

Solution to the household problem In the appendix B we show that we can find an explicit solution to the household problem (16): first, for every point in time (and state of nature) the optimal consumption is proportional to net wealth,

$$C^*(t) = \theta(t)N(t), \text{ where } \theta(t) \equiv \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[\rho + (\gamma - 1) \left(r(t) + \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} \right)^2 \right) \right], \tag{17}$$

and, second, the optimal share of net wealth invested in the risky asset is

$$w^*(t) = \frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\gamma \sigma_s(t)^2}. \tag{18}$$

This means that the demand for the risk-free asset is $B^*(t) = (1 - w^*(t))N(t)$ and the demand for the risky asset is $S^*(t) = w^*(t)N^*(t)$.

Observe that both decision variables depend on the Sharpe ratio:

$$\theta(t) \equiv \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[\rho + (\gamma - 1) \left(r(t) + \frac{X(t)^2}{2\gamma} \right) \right],$$

and

$$w^*(t) = \frac{X(t)}{\gamma \sigma_s(t)}.$$

Substituting the consumption and the portfolio weights, equations (17) and (18), in the budget constraint, equation (15), we find optimal net wealth dynamics at the household level

$$\frac{dN^*(t)}{N^*(t)} = \mu_n(t)dt + \sigma_n(t)dW(t) \quad (19)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_n(t) &= \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[r(t) - \rho + \frac{1 + \gamma}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} \right)^2 \right] \\ \sigma_n(t) &= \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Equilibrium in asset markets

As the risk-free asset is in zero net supply, then the equilibrium condition for the risky asset is $N^{eq}(t) = S^*(t)$ where $S^*(t)$ is the demand for risky assets by households, $S^*(t) = w^*(t)N(t)$. Therefore, at the equilibrium we have

$$w^{eq}(t) = 1,$$

that has several consequences:

First, using the optimal portfolio weight in equation (18) we find the equilibrium Sharpe ratio is proportional to the volatility of the risky asset

$$X^{eq}(t) = \frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} = \gamma \sigma_s(t).$$

Second, the expected change in the risky asset rate of return is equal to the risk-free rate of return plus $X\sigma_s$,

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}[dG(t)]}{S(t)dt} = \tilde{\mu}_s(t) = \mu_s(t) + \frac{1}{q(t)} = r(t) + \gamma(\sigma_s(t))^2, \quad (20)$$

Third, the diffusion and volatility coefficients in equation (19) become

$$\mu_n(t) = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(r - \rho + \frac{\gamma(1 + \gamma)}{2} \sigma_s(t)^2 \right), \text{ and } \sigma_n(t) = \sigma_s(t).$$

Good market equilibrium

The goods' market clearing condition is $C^{eq}(t) = D(t)$. Therefore, the equilibrium consumption process is generated by

$$dC^{eq}(t) = C^{eq}(t) (g dt + \sigma dW(t)), \text{ for } t \in \mathbb{R}_+$$

which is analog to the equilibrium consumption in the Arrow-Debreu economy.

From equation (17) and the goods market equilibrium condition we have $C^{eq}(t) = \theta^{eq}(t)N^{eq}(t) = D(t)$ where

$$\frac{C^{eq}(t)}{N^{eq}(t)} = \theta^{eq}(t) = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[\rho + (\gamma - 1) \left(r + \frac{\gamma}{2} \sigma_s(t)^2 \right) \right].$$

Furthermore, because $S^{eq}(t) = N^{eq}(t)$ and $S(t) = q(t)D(t)$ then there is an equilibrium equation for the price-dividend ratio $q^{eq}(t) \theta^{eq}(t) = 1$ yielding

$$q(t) \left(\rho + (\gamma - 1) \left(r(t) + \frac{1}{2\gamma} (\gamma \sigma_s(t))^2 \right) \right) = \gamma. \quad (21)$$

The relationship $q(t) \theta(t) = 1$ involves an indeterminacy as regards the time evolution of both variables. However, as in equilibrium C is perfectly correlated to D , and we assume it is also perfectly correlated with N , then N is also perfectly correlated with D then $\frac{1}{q^{eq}} = \theta^{eq}$ is a constant (time-independent) to be determined.

To have a determinate equilibrium, we should have

$$\frac{dC(t)}{C(t)} = \frac{dN(t)}{N(t)} = \frac{dD(t)}{D(t)},$$

which is equivalent to an equality between the two diffusion processes

$$\mu_n(t)dt + \sigma_n(t)dW(t) = gdt + \sigma dW(t).$$

Matching the diffusion and the volatility terms, we find

$$g = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(r - \rho + \frac{\gamma(1+\gamma)}{2} \sigma_s^2 \right) \quad (22)$$

$$\sigma = \sigma_s. \quad (23)$$

Solving equations (20), (21), (22), and (23) for q , r , μ_s and σ_s we obtain the equilibrium values for the rate of interest,

$$r^{eq}(t) = \begin{cases} \rho + \gamma \left(g - \left(\frac{1+\gamma}{2} \right) \sigma^2 \right), & \text{if } \gamma > 0 \text{ and } \neq 1 \\ \rho + g - \sigma^2, & \text{if } \gamma = 1 \end{cases} \text{ for every } t \in [0, \infty) \quad (24)$$

for the equilibrium price-dividend ratio

$$q^{eq}(t) = \begin{cases} (\rho + (\gamma - 1)(g - \gamma\sigma^2))^{-1}, & \text{if } \gamma > 0 \text{ and } \neq 1 \\ \rho^{-1}, & \text{if } \gamma = 1 \end{cases} \text{ for every } t \in [0, \infty) \quad (25)$$

and for the drift and volatility of the rate of return of the risky asset

$$\mu_s^{eq} = g - \gamma \left(\frac{1 - \gamma}{2} \right) \sigma^2, \text{ and } \sigma_s^{eq} = \sigma$$

as a function of the fundamentals and of the behavioral parameters.

The **equilibrium rate of return for the risky asset**, $\frac{dG^{eq}(t)}{S(t)} = \tilde{\mu}^{s,eq}dt + \sigma^{s,eq}dW(t)$, follows a diffusion process

$$\frac{dG^{eq}(t)}{S(t)} = \begin{cases} \left(\rho + \gamma g + \gamma \left(\frac{1 - \gamma}{2} \right) \sigma^2 \right) dt + \sigma dW(t), & \text{if } \gamma > 0 \text{ and } \neq 1 \\ (\rho + g) dt + \sigma dW(t), & \text{if } \gamma = 1. \end{cases} \quad (26)$$

Figure 3 presents an illustration of the dynamics of the rate of return for the risky asset.




Figure 3: The rate of return for the risky asset: parameters $\sigma = 0.085$, $\rho = 0.02$, $g = 0.015$, $\gamma = 6$ and $r(0) = 0.05$

2.3.5 Comparing with the Arrow-Debreu model

The stochastic discount factor process at the equilibrium (see the Appendix B.3) follows the process

$$dM(t) = -M(rdt + XdW(t))$$

where X is the market price of risk:

$$X = \frac{\tilde{\mu}^s - r}{\sigma_s}.$$

If we substitute the equilibrium rates of return for the risk-free and risky asset from equation (24) and (26), respectively, we find that $X^{eq} = \gamma\sigma$

Comparing with the solution we found for the Arrow-Debreu economy, in equations (11) and (12), we observe that $\mu_m = r^{eq}$ and $\sigma_m = X^{eq} = \gamma\sigma$. Therefore, the **implied equilibrium stochastic discount factor for this finance economy is the same as in the Arrow-Debreu economy**, in which the endowment is exogenously supplied to the household.

This means that those two institutional settings provide equivalent market mechanisms to generate an equilibrium intertemporal allocations of resources. This also means that the financial markets in this unconstrained finance economy are complete.

In both economies we conclude that **the only source of aggregate risks are fundamental exogenous aggregate risks** introduced by $(W(t))_{t \geq 0}$.

3 Heterogeneous market participation

In the previous section we assumed households are homogeneous. Among several dimensions of heterogeneity, one that is empirically relevant is related to the fact that there is heterogeneity in financial market participation: one a relatively small fraction of households invest in risk bearing assets. The model in the previous section is consistent with a case in all households have the same portfolio structure, independently of their level of financial wealth, which is counterfactual.

In this section we consider a first type of financial friction originated by **limited asset market participation**. This means that there are agents which do not participate in the risky asset market while others do. This introduces **heterogeneity in the composition of the net wealth** among economic agents.

Limited asset market participation generates one form of **illiquidity**, in the sense that some agents cannot fully insure against uncertainty, which has consequences on the risk bearing and hedging of agents, and, possibly on the **existence of an endogenous source of macroeconomic risk**. This endogenous source of risk adds to the exogenous aggregate risks which is the same as in the case of the frictionless economy that we studied in the last section. In this case, there is an additional source of uncertainty which channels productivity uncertainty through the distribution of dividend income.

Again we assume that there are two assets: a risk-free asset in zero net supply, and a risky asset in positive net supply. There are two groups of homogeneous agents: there is a group of households that cannot hold the risky asset (called **households** in the literature) and other group of agents that participate in both markets (called **specialists** in several papers). Both groups share the same information and preferences. We continue to assume that the only source of income is financial income. There are several explanations for this difference in participation, v.g., informational constraints or existence of transaction costs.

Because non-participants (households) can only hold the risk-free asset, and because it is in zero net supply, the participants (specialists) finance their holdings of risky assets by holding short positions (i.e, taking loans) in the risk-free asset. This implies that the fluctuations in fundamentals are completely absorbed by the specialists. We will see that the distribution of net wealth varies and drives the dynamics of the equilibrium rates of return, because their level of wealth is one of the determinants of the demand for risky assets thus influencing its price. If we assume there are no arbitrage opportunities, then the risk free rate of return is also affected.

We will also see that the type of utility function has a relevant effect on the equilibrium properties: **if the utility function is logarithmic an endogenous source of risk does not exist, but if the utility function displays a higher level of risk aversion there is an endogenous source of risk.** This is natural, because the concavity of the utility function is related to the risk aversion behavior.

We present next a version of the Basak and Cuoco (1998) model (see Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) for a discussion).

3.1 The model

In this subsection we present the DSGE of this model and in the next subsection we solve and characterize it. We assume that the only source of heterogeneity is the asset market participation, which means that the preferences and information of both households and specialists is the same.

3.1.1 The households' problem

Non-participating households, denoted by an index h , consume C^h and hold net wealth, N^h , by solving the problem

$$\max_{C^h} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty \frac{(C^h(t))^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} e^{-\rho t} dt \right]$$

subject to the budget constraint,

$$dN^h(t) = (r(t)N^h(t) - C^h(t)) dt, \quad t \in [0, \infty)$$

where $N^h(0) = n_0^h$ is given, and $r(t)$ is again the rate of return of the risk free asset, which is taken as given by the household. The first order condition is

$$C^h(t) = \theta^h(t)N^h(t), \text{ where } \theta^h(t) = \frac{\rho + (\gamma - 1)r(t)}{\gamma}. \quad (27)$$

Therefore, at the optimum, the net wealth of the household is driven by

$$\frac{dN^h(t)}{N^h(t)} = \left(\frac{r(t) - \rho}{\gamma} \right) dt, \quad (28)$$

where $N^h(0)$ is given.

3.1.2 Specialists' problem

Participating, or specialist, households can participate in both asset markets. They solve the problem

$$\max_{C^x, w^x} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty \frac{(C^x(t))^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} e^{-\rho t} dt \right]$$

where, C^x and w^x denote consumption and the weight of the risky asset in net wealth, respectively, subject to the budget constraint

$$dN^x(t) = [r(t)(1 - w^x(t)) dt + \tilde{\mu}_s(t)w^x(t)] N^x(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)w^x(t)N^x(t)dW(t) - C^x(t)dt$$

where $N^x(0) = n_0^x$ is given. These households are also price takers in both asset markets, where the rate or return for the risky asset is as in equation (14), which is taken as given by these households.

This is the same problem as the problem for the representative agent in the frictionless financial economy we presented in the previous section. As in that model, we assume that there are exogenous dividends accruing to the holders of the risky asset following the process given in equation (13).

$$C^x(t) = \theta^x(t)N^x(t), \text{ where } \theta^x(t) \equiv \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[\rho + (\gamma - 1) \left(r(t) + \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} \right)^2 \right) \right] \quad (29)$$

the portfolio weight of the risky asset is

$$w^x(t) = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{(\sigma_s(t))^2} \right). \quad (30)$$

The net wealth for a participating household is driven by the diffusion equation

$$\frac{dN^x(t)}{N^x(t)} = \mu_n^x(t)dt + \sigma_n^x(t)dW(t) \quad (31)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_n^x(t) &= \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[r(t) - \rho + \frac{1+\gamma}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} \right)^2 \right] \\ \sigma_n^x(t) &= \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} \right).\end{aligned}$$

3.1.3 Balance sheet constraints

Denoting by $B^h(t)$ and $B^x(t)$ the stocks of bonds for non-participating and participating households, respectively, and by $S(t)$ the stock of risky assets, we specify the balance sheet constraint for non-participating households as $N^h(t) = B^h(t)$, and for participating households as $N^x(t) = B^x(t) + S(t)$. All those variables are in nominal terms.

We assume that $B^h(t) \geq 0$, meaning that non-participating households are lenders and participating households are borrowers in the risk-free asset market. Therefore $B^x(t)$ corresponds to risk-free financing of purchases of risky assets by participating agents, and $-B^x(t)/S(t)$ is the leverage ratio. This is equivalent to setting $w^x(t) \geq 1$.

3.1.4 General equilibrium

Definition 3. General equilibrium for the limited participation finance economy It is defined by the allocations $(C^{h,eq}(t), C^{x,eq}(t), B^{h,eq}(t), B^{x,eq}(t), S^{eq}(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ and the returns $(r^{eq}(t), r^{s,eq}(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ such that, given the aggregate risk process $(W(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$:

1. non-participating and participating households solve their particular problems, taking as given the rates of return of the risk free and risky assets;
2. aggregate net wealth:

$$N^{eq}(t) = N^{h,eq}(t) + N^{x,eq}(t), \text{ for each } t \in [0, \infty) \quad (32)$$

3. markets clear: the good's market clearing condition is

$$C^{eq}(t) = C^{h,eq}(t) + C^{x,eq}(t) = D(t),$$

where $C(t)$ is aggregate consumption; the risk-free market clearing condition is

$$B^{eq}(t) = B^{h,eq}(t) + B^{x,eq}(t) = 0$$

and the risky asset market clearing condition is

$$S^{eq}(t) = N^{eq}(t).$$

3.2 Finding and characterizing the DSGE

In the rest of this section all variables refer to equilibrium values, and, to lighten the text we do not denote it explicitly.

3.2.1 Consumption

As in the previous models, from the equilibrium in the product market we have $C(t) = D(t)$, and, therefore,

$$dC(t) = C(t) (g dt + \sigma dW(t)), \text{ for } t \in \mathbb{R}_+.$$

3.2.2 Share of specialists and leverage

Denoting the share of the specialists in the total net wealth of the economy

$$\eta(t) \equiv \frac{N^x(t)}{N(t)}.$$

In equilibrium, from the balance sheet constraints, and from the equilibrium conditions for the asset markets, equation (32), we find that the share of the specialists in total wealth is equal to

$$\eta(t) \equiv \frac{N^x(t)}{N(t)} = \frac{N^x(t)}{S(t)}.$$

However, from equation (30) we have $w^x(t) = \frac{S(t)}{N^x(t)}$ implying that

$$\eta(t) = \frac{1}{w^x(t)}.$$

Then differently from the frictionless case, $w^x \geq 1$ because the position of the specialists in the risky asset is leveraged. This implies that the share of the risky asset in the portfolio of the specialists, is constrained to be smaller or equal to one: $\eta(t) \in (0, 1]$. There is also a relationship between the Sharpe ratio and η , at equilibrium,

$$X(t) = \frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} = \gamma \frac{\sigma_s(t)}{\eta(t)}, \quad (33)$$

which means that it depends on the share of specialists in the aggregate net worth.

3.2.3 Leverage

The leverage of this economy can be measured by the weight of bonds in the balance-sheet of non-participating households relative to the stock of risky assets, in the balance-sheet of participating households. Then, as

$$\ell(t) = -\frac{B^x(t)}{S(t)} = \frac{B^h(t)}{S(t)} = \frac{N^h(t)}{N(t)} = 1 - \eta(t)$$

then η measures implicitly the degree of leverage of the economy: the higher η is the smaller the degree of leverage is.

3.2.4 Dividend-price ratio in equilibrium

The aggregate consumption, using the consumption optimality conditions, equations (27) and (29), and the definition of η , is

$$\begin{aligned} C(t) &= C^h(t) + C^x(t) = \\ &= \theta^h(t)N^h(t) + \theta^x(t)N^x(t) = \\ &= \left(\theta^h(t)\eta(t) + \theta^x(t)(1 - \eta(t)) \right) N(t). \end{aligned}$$

The good's market clearing condition is $C(t) = D(t)$ leads to

$$D(t) = \left(\theta^h(t)\eta(t) + \theta^x(t)(1 - \eta(t)) \right) N(t).$$

Recalling the definition of the price dividend ratio $q(t) D(t) = S(t)$ and because $S(t) = N(t)$ at the equilibrium, then

$$\left(\theta^h(t)\eta(t) + \theta^x(t)(1 - \eta(t)) \right) N(t) = D(t) = \frac{N(t)}{q(t)},$$

which implies

$$\left(\theta^h(t)\eta(t) + \theta^x(t)(1 - \eta(t)) \right) q(t) = 1.$$

This condition compares with an analogous constraint for the frictionless finance economy in the last section where $\theta(t) q(t) = 1$.

Substituting $\theta^h(t)$ and $\theta^x(t)$, from equations (27) and (29), this is equivalent to

$$\left[\rho + (\gamma - 1) \left(r(t) + \eta(t) \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} \right)^2 \right) \right] q(t) = \gamma,$$

and, from equation (33), the dividend-price ratio in equilibrium is a function of the share of participants in total wealth

$$\frac{1}{q(t)} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left\{ \rho + (\gamma - 1) \left(r(t) + \frac{1}{2\gamma} (\gamma \sigma_s(t))^2 \left(\frac{1}{\eta(t)} \right) \right) \right\}. \quad (34)$$

If we compare with the analogous equation for the frictionless economy, in equation (21), we see that the wealth distribution variable has an influence in the way volatility is transmitted to the dividend-price ratio.

3.2.5 Dynamics of N

The aggregate net wealth change is $dN(t) = dN^h(t) + dN^x(t)$. Then, from equations (28), (31) and (33)

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dN(t)}{N(t)} &= (1 - \eta(t)) \frac{dN^h(t)}{N^h(t)} + \eta(t) \frac{dN^x(t)}{N^x(t)} \\ &= \mu_s(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)dW(t). \end{aligned}$$

The drift for the rate of return of the risky asset (see equation (14) for the process followed by the return of the risky asset) in equilibrium

$$\mu_s(t) = \tilde{\mu}_s(t) - \frac{1}{q(t)} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[r(t) - \rho + \gamma \left(\frac{1 + \gamma}{2} \right) \frac{(\sigma_s(t))^2}{\eta(t)} \right], \quad (35)$$

depends on the rate of interest $r(t)$, the volatility $\sigma_s(t)$, and the asset distribution $\eta(t)$.

This allows us to obtain the dynamics for the share of the specialists on total wealth, η , and a dynamic equation for the equity price ratio, q , which can be seen as two state variables driving the equilibrium rates of return.

3.2.6 Dynamics of η

As $\eta(t) = 1 - \frac{N^h(t)}{N(t)}$ then, using Itô's formula

$$\begin{aligned} d\eta(t) &= -\frac{N^h(t)}{N(t)} \left[\frac{dN^h(t)}{N^h(t)} - \frac{dN(t)}{N(t)} + \left(\frac{dN(t)}{N(t)} \right)^2 \right] = \\ &= -(1 - \eta(t)) \left[\left(\frac{r(t) - \rho}{\gamma} \right) dt - (\mu_s(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)dW(t)) + (\sigma_s(t))^2 dt \right] = \\ &= -(1 - \eta(t)) \left[\left(\frac{r(t) - \rho}{\gamma} - \mu_s(t) + (\sigma_s(t))^2 \right) dt + \sigma_s(t)dW(t) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Substituting the drift of the risky asset price process, in equation (35), we obtain the equation for the dynamics of the wealth distribution

$$d\eta(t) = (1 - \eta(t)) \left[\frac{(\sigma_s(t))^2}{\eta(t)} \left(\frac{1 + \gamma}{2} - \eta(t) \right) dt + \sigma_s(t) dW(t) \right]. \quad (36)$$

This equation can be written as a diffusion process

$$d\eta(t) = (1 - \eta(t)) [\mu_\eta(t, \eta(t)) dt + \sigma_s(t) dW(t)], \quad (37)$$

where the drift component,

$$\mu_\eta(\eta) \equiv \frac{(\sigma_s)^2}{\eta} \left(\frac{1 + \gamma}{2} - \eta \right),$$

is negatively related to η if $\gamma \geq 1$.

3.2.7 Dynamics of q

The dividend-price ratio, $1/q(t)$, also follows a diffusion process. Applying Itô's formula, to $1/q(t) = D(t)/N(t)$, we get

$$\begin{aligned} d\left(\frac{1}{q(t)}\right) &= \frac{dD(t)}{N(t)} - \frac{D(t)}{N(t)} \frac{dN(t)}{N(t)} - \frac{dD(t)}{N(t)} \frac{dN(t)}{N(t)} + \frac{D(t)}{N(t)} \left(\frac{dN(t)}{N(t)}\right)^2 = \\ &= \frac{D(t)}{N(t)} \left\{ \frac{dD(t)}{D(t)} - \frac{dN(t)}{N(t)} - \frac{dD(t)}{D(t)} \frac{dN(t)}{N(t)} + \left(\frac{dN(t)}{N(t)}\right)^2 \right\} = \\ &= \frac{1}{q(t)} \{g dt + \sigma dW(t) - \mu_s(t) dt - \sigma_s(t) dW(t) - \sigma \sigma_s(t) dt + (\sigma_s(t))^2 dt\}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the dividend-price ratio also follows a diffusion process

$$d\left(\frac{1}{q(t)}\right) = \frac{1}{q(t)} \{\mu_q(t) dt + \sigma_q dW(t)\} \quad (38)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_q(t) &= g + \frac{\rho - r(t)}{\gamma} - \left(\frac{1 + \gamma}{2}\right) \frac{(\sigma_s(t))^2}{\eta(t)} + \sigma_s(t) (\sigma_s(t) - \sigma) \\ \sigma_q(t) &= \sigma - \sigma_s(t) \end{aligned}$$

From the last equation we find that the net-wealth volatility can have two components

$$\sigma_s(t) = \sigma + \sigma_q(t)$$

where the first is a **fundamental** (exogenous) component and the second is an **endogenous component**.

3.2.8 Equilibrium interest rate and volatility

In equation (34) we find there is a contemporaneous relationship between the dividend-price ratio and the distributional of wealth η . Taking derivatives of equation (34), and observing that $dr(t) = r(t)dt$ and $d\sigma_s(t) = \sigma_s(t)dt$, we find

$$d\left(\frac{1}{q(t)}\right) = \left[\left(\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\right) r(t) + (\gamma-1) (\sigma_s(t))^2 \left(\frac{1}{\eta(t)}\right) \right] dt + \left(\frac{\gamma-1}{2}\right) (\sigma_s(t))^2 d\left(\frac{1}{\eta(t)}\right).$$

Matching the drift and diffusion terms of this equation and equation (38) yields a non-linear equation system in $r^{eq}(t)$ and $\sigma_s^{eq}(t)$

$$\begin{cases} \mu_q(r(t), \sigma_s(t), \eta(t)) = \left(\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\right) r(t) + (\gamma-1) (\sigma_s(t))^2 \left(\frac{1}{\eta(t)}\right) + \left(\frac{\gamma-1}{2}\right) (\sigma_s(t))^2 (1-\eta(t)) \mu_\eta(t, \eta(t)) \\ \sigma_q(\sigma_s(t)) = -\left(\frac{\gamma-1}{2}\right) (1-\eta(t)) (\sigma_s(t))^3. \end{cases} \quad (39)$$

This system does not seem to have closed form solution. However, in the general case, of an isoelastic utility function, the risk-free interest rate and the asset return volatility depend on the distribution of net wealth. This distinguishes this economy from the frictionless case.

3.3 Risk aversion and endogenous risk

As the solution clearly depends on the degree of risk aversion, let us consider first the benchmark case of a logarithmic utility function, i.e., $\gamma = 1$.

3.3.1 The logarithmic case

Setting $\gamma = 1$ in system (39), we find that the price dividend ratio is stationary

$$q(t) = \frac{1}{\rho}, \text{ for any } t \in [0, \infty).$$

Therefore, **there is no endogenous risk**, that is $\sigma_s^{eq}(t) = \sigma$ and the rate of return of the risky asset follows the process

$$dr^{s,eq}(t) = (g + \rho) dt + \sigma dW(t), \quad (40)$$

which is the same process as for the frictionless economy (see equation (26)).

The interest rate of debt contracts is positively correlated with the distribution of wealth parameter, η

$$r^{eq}(t) = \rho + g - \frac{\sigma^2}{\eta(t)}, \quad (41)$$

meaning that if η is low the demand for leverage by the participants is high. This exerts an upward pressure on the risk free interest rate, because of the dynamics of η . Substituting $\gamma = 1$ in equation (37) we determine the process followed by the wealth distribution:

$$\frac{d\eta(t)}{\eta(t)} = \left(\frac{1 - \eta(t)}{\eta(t)} \right)^2 \sigma^2 dt + \left(\frac{1 - \eta(t)}{\eta(t)} \right) \sigma dW(t). \quad (42)$$

Figure 4 illustrates one sample path for η , in the upper left subfigure, and one hundred sample paths, in the upper right subfigure. In the lower subfigure we substitute the first sample in equation (41) to obtain a sample path for the rate of return of the risk free asset. Although it looks as random, the effect of uncertainty is contemporaneous (as if it were a random variable) and not dynamic as in the equilibrium process for the rate of return of the risk free asset in equation (40). This is the case because the instantaneous change of the wealth distribution is associated to a random change in the demand for risk free bounds to which the rate of interest responds contemporaneously

In Figure 4 we see that the interest rate η converges asymptotically to one. In fact $\eta = 1$, if we look at equation (42) we see that the skeleton (i.e., the diffusion part) has $\eta = 1$ as a steady state. This steady state is an absorbing state because

$$\frac{d}{d\eta} \left(\frac{1 - \eta}{\eta} \right)^2 < 0$$

if $0 < \eta < 1$. This means that, asymptotically, all financial wealth will be concentrated on the specialists. This result can be changed if we introduced labor and human capital which would imply that the non-specialists would have positive total wealth. In this case the net wealth of the financially limited agents will converge to their human wealth.

The main difference from the non-financially constrained economy is that **the short run interest rate responds to the leverage of the economy**, i.e, to $1 - \eta$: we see that **the lower the interest rate the higher instantaneous leverage**. This process discourages further loans from the financially constrained households, which drives up the interest rate and reduces leverage.

3.3.2 Higher risk aversion

In a scenario with higher risk aversion, that is with $\gamma > 1$, we would have to solve system (39) in order to obtain the equilibrium expressions for $r(t)$ and $\sigma_s(t)$. It does not seem to have a closed form solution.

However, we can determine the volatility of the risky asset, σ_s , from the second equation

$$\frac{\sigma_q}{q} = \frac{\sigma_s - \sigma}{q} = \left(\frac{\gamma - 1}{2} \right) (1 - \eta)(\sigma_s)^3. \quad (43)$$




Figure 4: The limited participation model: logarithmic utility

We readily see that it is higher than the fundamental volatility, that is $\sigma_s \geq \sigma$, for $0 < \eta \leq 1$, meaning that when agents are highly risk averse the existence of limited participation generates endogenous volatility and that this volatility is a function of the asset distribution. In equation (43) we readily see that **asset volatility is positively related to leverage** (if we set $\sigma_s = \sigma_s(\eta)$ we have $\sigma'_s(\eta) < 0$). This means that:

- if the leverage ratio is low, i.e., η is close to one, then the endogenous component of volatility will be low and the volatility of the risky asset will approach the fundamental volatility;
- if the leverage ratio is high, i.e., η is close to zero, the endogenous component of volatility is high and the volatility of the risky asset will be higher than the fundamental volatility.

4 Technological illiquidity frictions

In this section we present a version of a model presented in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) in which there are, in the words of those authors, **technological illiquidity**. In this model the dividends' process and the capital accumulation processes are endogeneized (following a model by Bernanke et al. (1999)) with two assumptions: (1) the production function displays constant returns to scale; and (2) there are adjustments costs in investment having a convex deterministic component and a linear stochastic component. The last assumption is the source of technological illiquidity.

We first consider the frictionless financial markets version and then present the limited market participation version. In order to isolate the source of market volatility generated by technologic liquidity we assume that preferences and information are homogeneous and the utility function is logarithmic.

4.1 Unrestricted market participation

There are two dimensions of the technology in this economy: first, the production function displays constant returns to scale, $Y(t) = AK(t)$; second, the investment technology involves adjustment costs taking the form convex costs for installing capital. In particular, we assume that investment expenditures, $I(t) = \iota(t)K(t)$, generate a deterministic increase in gross capital $\Phi(\iota)K(t)$, where $\Phi(0) = 0$, $\Phi''(\iota) < 0 < \Phi'(\iota)$, and have a random component, capturing fundamental uncertainties in the investment process.

The capital accumulation equation follows the diffusion equation, featuring stochastic adjustment costs in investment,

$$\frac{dK(t)}{K(t)} = (\Phi(\iota(t)) - \delta) dt + \sigma dW(t)$$

where δ is the depreciation rate. We denote $\mu_k(t) = \Phi(\iota(t)) - \delta$ and $\sigma_k = \sigma$.

Investment in physical capital generates a dividend, which is equal to output subtracted by the investment expenditures,

$$D(t) = (A - \iota(t)) K(t).$$

Denoting the asset value of the firm by $S(t)$, the return for holding the capital of the firm is the sum of the changes in capital gains and dividends

$$dr_s(t) = \frac{dS(t)}{S(t)} + \frac{D(t)}{S(t)} dt.$$

Writing the balance-sheet condition $S(t) = q(t)K(t)$, where q is called Tobin's q , the return for holding the capital is

$$dr_s(t) = \frac{d(q(t)K(t))}{q(t)K(t)} + \frac{D(t)}{q(t)K(t)} dt.$$

We **conjecture** that the relative price of capital $q(t)$ is driven by a diffusion process

$$\frac{dq(t)}{q(t)} = \mu_q(t)dt + \sigma_q(t)dW(t)$$

where $\mu_q(t)$ and $\sigma_q(t)$ are to be determined in equilibrium.

If this conjecture is right, the capital gains dynamics is driven by the equation, after applying Itô's formula,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d(q(t)K(t))}{q(t)K(t)} &= \left(\mu_q(t) + \mu_k(t) + \sigma_q(t)\sigma_k(t) \right) dt + \left(\sigma_q(t) + \sigma_k(t) \right) dW(t) \\ &= \left(\mu_q(t) + \Phi(\iota(t)) - \delta + \sigma_q(t)\sigma \right) dt + \left(\sigma_q(t) + \sigma \right) dW(t) \end{aligned}$$

where σ represents fundamental, exogenous, volatility and σ_q is the endogenous volatility component.

At last, we obtain the process followed by the rate of return from investment in the risky asset

$$dr_s(t) = [d(q(t), \iota(t)) + \Phi(\iota(t)) - \delta + \sigma_q(t)\sigma + \mu_q(t)] dt + (\sigma_q(t) + \sigma) dW(t). \quad (44)$$

where the dividend-price ratio

$$d(q(t), \iota(t)) \equiv \frac{A - \iota(t)}{q(t)}$$

is a negative function of both the relative price of capital and the investment rate.

Using our previous notation, this is equivalent to

$$dr_s(t) = \tilde{\mu}_s(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)dW(t),$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\mu}_s(t) &= d(q(t), \iota(t)) + \Phi(\iota(t)) - \delta + \mu_q(t) + \sigma_q(t)\sigma \\ \sigma_s(t) &= \sigma_q(t) + \sigma\end{aligned}$$

If we assume that there is no heterogeneity and no financial frictions, this return is received by the representative household which own the firms, and has the balance sheet constraint

$$B(t) + q(t)K(t) = N(t),$$

where $B(t)$ is the household stock of risk-free assets and $N(t)$ is the household net wealth.

Definition 4. General equilibrium Is defined by the allocations $(C^{eq}(t), i^{eq}(t), B^{eq}(t), K^{eq}(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ and the returns $(r^{eq}(t), r^{s,eq}(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$ such that, given the aggregate risk process $(W(t))_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}$:

1. the representative household solves its problem, that is, it maximizes the utility functional (2) subject to the instantaneous budget constraint (15), given the asset income processes;
2. the representative firm maximizes its profits $\pi(\iota) = q\Phi(\iota) - \iota$, at every point in time;
3. markets clear: $C^{eq}(t) + I^{eq}(t) = Y(t)$, $B^{eq}(t) = 0$, and $S^{eq}(t) = N^{eq}(t)$, at every time and state of nature.

4.1.1 Households' optimality

If we assume a **logarithmic utility function**, the households' problem is

$$\begin{aligned}\max_{C(\cdot), w(\cdot)} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty \ln(C(t)) e^{-\rho t} dt \right] \\ \text{subject to} \\ dN(t) = N(t) \left((1 - w(t)) r(t) dt + w(t) (\tilde{\mu}_s(t) dt + \sigma_s(t) dW(t)) \right) - C(t) dt \\ N(0) = n_0 \text{ given.}\end{aligned}\tag{45}$$

The optimality condition for the household is proportional to net wealth

$$C(t) = \rho N(t),\tag{46}$$

and the demand for the two assets is $B(t) = (1 - w(t))N(t)$ and $S(t) = w(t)N(t)$, where

$$w(t) = \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{(\sigma_s(t))^2} \right) = \frac{X(t)}{\sigma_s(t)}.\tag{47}$$

As in the previous model the net wealth dynamics is driven by a diffusion process

$$\frac{dN(t)}{N(t)} = \mu_n(t)dt + \sigma_n(t)dW(t) \quad (48)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_n &= r - \rho + \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right)^2 \\ \sigma_n &= \frac{\tilde{\mu}_s - r}{\sigma_s}. \end{aligned}$$

4.1.2 Firm' optimality

Firm's problem is to maximize profits by choosing investment ι . As firm's profit is

$$\pi(\iota) = q\Phi(\iota) - \iota,$$

then the optimum investment condition is

$$q\Phi'(\iota) = 1.$$

From the implicit function theorem, investment is an increasing function of the relative price of capital,

$$\iota(t) = \Psi(q(t)), \quad \Psi'(q) > 0.$$

This implies that the dividend-price ratio is decreasing with q , $\frac{D}{S} = \hat{d}(q) = d(q, \Psi(q))$, for $\tilde{d}'(q) < 0$.

4.1.3 The equilibrium in asset markets

The aggregation and market equilibrium for the risk free asset, $B^{eq}(t) = 0$, and $N^{eq}(t) = S^{eq}(t) = q^{eq}(t)K^{eq}(t)$ implies

$$w^{eq} = \frac{q(t)K(t)}{N(t)} = 1.$$

There are two implications: first

$$q(t)K(t) = N(t) \quad (49)$$

and

$$\tilde{\mu}_s(t) = r(t) + (\sigma_s(t))^2. \quad (50)$$

4.1.4 Good's market equilibrium

The goods' market equilibrium condition, is

$$AK(t) = C(t) + \iota(t)K(t).$$

As at the equilibrium $C(t) = \rho q(t)K(t)$, then $A = \rho q(t) + \iota(t)$. Therefore, the equilibrium dividend per unit of capital is equal to the rate of time preference,

$$\hat{d}(q) = \rho.$$

This condition together with the optimality condition for firms yield a system of two equations in (q, ι) ,

$$\begin{cases} \rho q + \iota = A \\ q \Phi'(\iota) = 1 \end{cases} \quad (51)$$

which has an unique solution for q and ι , $\bar{q} = \bar{q}(A, \rho)$ and $\bar{\iota} = \bar{\iota}(A, \rho)$, both positively related to productivity and negatively related to the rate of time preference ⁶.

4.1.5 Finding the equilibrium rate of return

As the price of capital, and the investment rate, is stationary at the equilibrium we obtain $\mu_q^{eq} = \sigma_q^{eq} = 0$. Therefore

$$\frac{d(q(t)K(t))}{q(t)K(t)} = (\Phi(\bar{\iota}(A, \rho)) - \delta) dt + \sigma dW(t).$$

The dynamics for the net wealth, from the solution of the household problem is

$$\frac{dN(t)}{N(t)} = (r(t) - \rho + (\sigma_s(t))^2) dt + \sigma_s(t)dW(t).$$

From the market equilibrium condition (49) we should have

$$\frac{d(q(t)K(t))}{q(t)K(t)} = \frac{dN(t)}{N(t)}.$$

Matching the two equations allows us to find the equilibrium asset return volatility, $\sigma_s(t) = \sigma$, and equilibrium risk-free interest rate

$$r^{eq}(t) = \rho + R(A, \rho) - \sigma^2. \quad (52)$$

⁶To see this take the total differential to the second equation: $dq\Phi'(\iota) + q\Phi''(\iota)d\iota = 0$. Because $\Phi(\cdot)$ is increasing and concave then this equation features a positive relation between q and ι . As the other equation features a negative relation, therefore the system has one unique and positive solution.

where the net rate of return on capital is

$$R(A, \rho) \equiv \bar{\Phi}(\bar{v}(A, \rho)) - \delta.$$

Because $R_A = \frac{\partial R}{\partial A} > 0$ this means that an increase in productivity will increase the risk-free interest rate. Substituting in equation (50) we determine the equilibrium process for the rate of return for capital

$$dr_s^{eq}(t) = \tilde{\mu}_s^{eq} dt + \sigma_s^{eq} dW(t) = (\rho + R(A, \rho)) dt + \sigma dW(t), \quad (53)$$

Furthermore, the equilibrium rate of growth of aggregate net wealth is $N(t) = \bar{q}(A, \rho)K(t)$,

$$\frac{dN^{eq}(t)}{N^{eq}(t)} = (R(A, \rho) - \rho) dt + \sigma dW(t)$$

The rate of growth increases with the productivity, and, again the uncertainty is driven by the fundamentals.

4.2 Limited asset market participation

Now the balance sheet constraints are: for households $B^h(t) = N^h(t)$ and for specialists $S(t) + B^x(t) = N^x(t)$, where $S(t) = q(t)K(t)$. The aggregate net wealth is $N(t) = N^h(t) + N^x(t)$.

Again we denote the weight of specialists on the aggregate wealth by $\eta(t) = N^x(t)/N(t)$.

Assuming again that the risk-free asset is in zero net supply the market equilibrium condition is $B^h(t) + B^x(t) = 0$. Consolidating the accounts and using this market equilibrium condition we obtain again $S(t) = q(t)K(t) = N(t)$.

The good's market equilibrium condition is

$$AK(t) = C(t) + \iota(t)K(t)$$

where aggregate consumption is

$$C(t) = C^h(t) + C^x(t) = \rho(N^h(t) + N^x(t)) = \rho N(t) = \rho q(t)K(t).$$

assuming again a logarithmic utility function.

Therefore, we have again

$$A - \iota(t) = \rho q(t).$$

This equation together with the optimality condition for investment by the firm, $q(t)\Phi'(\iota(t)) = 1$, implies that both q and ι are constant as in the previous section, and functions of (A, ρ) , $q = \bar{q}(A, \rho)$ and $\iota = \bar{\iota}(A, \rho)$.

This implies that the equilibrium value of capital follows the process

$$\frac{d(q(t)K(t))}{q(t)K(t)} = (\Phi(\bar{\iota}(A, \rho)) - \delta) dt + \sigma dW(t) = R(A, \rho)dt + \sigma dW(t).$$

In order to derive the equilibrium dynamics for the aggregate demand of risky assets, which satisfies $S(t) = N(t) = N^h(t) + N^x(t)$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} dN(t) &= dN^h(t) + dN^x(t) = \\ &= N^h(t)(r(t) - \rho)dt + N^x(t) \left(r(t) - \rho + \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} \right)^2 + \frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} dW(t) \right) = \\ &= N(t) \left[\left(r(t) - \rho + \eta(t) \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} \right)^2 \right) dt + \eta(t) \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)} \right) dW(t) \right] = \\ &= N(t) \left[\left(r(t) - \rho + \frac{(\sigma_s(t))^2}{\eta(t)} \right) dt + \sigma_s(t) dW(t) \right] \end{aligned}$$

Matching again the two diffusion processes, because at the equilibrium $N(t) = q(t)K(t)$, we find $\sigma_s^{eq}(t) = \sigma$ and

$$r^{eq}(t) = \rho + R(A, \rho) - \frac{\sigma^2}{\eta(t)}$$

the process for the return of the risky asset is the same as in equation (53), and is independent from the distribution of wealth, η

The risk-free interest rate is, as in the model in section 3. We also find that the dynamics for the wealth distribution is driven by the equation

$$\frac{d\eta(t)}{\eta(t)} = \left(\frac{1 - \eta(t)}{\eta(t)} \sigma \right)^2 dt + \left(\frac{1 - \eta(t)}{\eta(t)} \sigma \right) dW(t).$$

5 Other frictions

The models we have presented are very simple. Most models do not display endogenous risk, with the exception of the model in which there is limited participation and non logarithmic preferences.

In order to obtain richer dynamics other type of frictions can be introduced. Most of the frictions are generated by some sort of discontinuity. But the number of frictions considered in the literature is huge.

Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) consider a model in which both households and specialists invest in two assets, risky and riskless, and there is some sort of heterogeneity affecting the rate of return of the risky capital ($\tilde{\mu}_s$ and/or σ_s). If there are no more requirements on structure of the balance sheet of the agents, the model will display results similar to those in section 4. However, if there is a requirement that the specialists keep a higher share of investment in equity and the non-specialists are constrained to lend in the risk-free markets, this introduces another mechanism for the share of wealth η affecting the volatility σ_s away from the fundamentals.

Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) consider a case in which loans to firms, because of asymmetries of information, require a collateral. This means that loans cannot be higher than a given proportion of net wealth, v.g $B^h(t) \leq \kappa N^x(t)$. This generates an amplification mechanism contracting investment when asset prices are depressed.

He and Krishnamurty (2012) and He and Krishnamurty (2013) assume that households do not invest directly in the risky asset but invest through an intermediary. This generates an agency problem because households and intermediaries have asymmetric information regarding the market conditions for risky assets. In order to secure financing from households, via risk-free assets, the intermediary has to consider incentive compatible contracts with the household. In depressed markets for the risky asset, the intermediary may be constrained from investing in the risky asset because it should satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint for securing financing from the households.

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Appendix

A Arrow-Debreu equilibrium

Given the assumptions on boundedness we can form the Lagrangean

$$\mathcal{L} = E_0 \left[\int_0^\infty (u(C(t))e^{-\rho t} + \lambda M(t)(Y(t) - C(t))) dt \right]$$

where λ is a constant. The f.o.c are

$$u'(c(t, \omega))e^{-\rho t} = \lambda m(t, \omega), \text{ for each } (t, \omega(t)) \in \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathcal{F}_t.$$

As, at time $t = 0$ we have $u'(c(0)) = \lambda$, where consumption is deterministic, which allows us to determine λ . Then we can write

$$\frac{u'(c(t, \omega))}{u'(c(0))} = e^{\rho t} m(t, \omega), \text{ for each } (t, \omega(t)) \in \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathcal{F}_t.$$

The market clearing condition is satisfied, if we have demand equal supply for every time and state of nature. That is, $ceq(t, \omega) = y(t, \omega)$ for each $(t, \omega(t)) \in \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathcal{F}_t$. Therefore, we get **equilibrium stochastic discount factor** for any state of nature

$$m^{eq}(t, \omega) = e^{-\rho t} \frac{u'(y(t, \omega))}{u'(y(0))}, \text{ for each } (t, \omega) \in \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathcal{F}_t.$$

or, equivalently, $M^{eq}(t) = e^{-\rho t} \frac{u'(Y(t))}{u'(y(0))}$ for every $t \in \mathbb{R}_+$. This proves equation (7).

To derive equation (8) we write $m = f(t, y)$. Observing that Y follows the stochastic differential equation (1) and

$$\begin{aligned} f_t(t, y) &= -\rho m, \\ f_y(t, y) &= -m \frac{u''(y)}{u'(y)} = -m \frac{r_r(y)}{y}, \\ f_{yy}(t, y) &= m \left(\frac{u'''(y)}{u'(y)} \right) = m \frac{r_r(y)}{y}, \frac{\pi_r(y)}{y} \end{aligned}$$

where $r_r(\cdot)$ and $\pi_r(\cdot)$ are the coefficients of relative risk aversion and prudence, respectively. From Itô's lemma

$$\begin{aligned} dM &= f_t(t, Y)dt + f_y(t, Y)dY + \frac{1}{2}f_{yy}(t, Y)(dY)^2 \\ &= \left(f_t(t, Y) + f_y(t, Y)gY + \frac{1}{2}f_{yy}(t, Y)(\sigma Y)^2 \right)dt + f_y(t, Y)\sigma Y dW \\ &= \left(-\rho M - M r_r(Y)g + \frac{1}{2}M r_r(y)\pi_r(Y)\sigma^2 \right)dt - M r_r(Y)\sigma dW, \end{aligned}$$

yielding equation (8).

B Solving the representative household problem in a finance economy

Here we consider the representative household problem in a finance economy, when it participates in all the financial markets and chooses consumption and its financial portfolio to maximize an intertemporal utility functional,

$$\max_{c,w} E_0 \left[\int_0^\infty u(C(t)) e^{-\rho t} dt \right] \quad (54)$$

subject to the instantaneous budget constraint, in its differential representation,

$$dN(t) = \{[r(t)(1 - w(t)) + \mu_s(t)w(t)]N(t) + y(t) - c(t)\} dt + w(t)\sigma_s(t)N(t)dW(t). \quad (55)$$

where $N(0) = n_0$ is given and $N(\cdot)$ is bounded, v.g., $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} N(t) \geq 0$. This is a stochastic optimal control problem with infinite horizon, and two control variables. There are three different methods to solve this problem: (1) dynamic programming; (2) stochastic control; and (3) martingale methods.

B.1 Solution by the principle of dynamic programming

Next we solve it by using the principle of dynamic programming (see Fleming and Rishel (1975) or Seierstad (2009)). This is the most common method of solution.

Let the realization at an arbitrary time t of the stochastic processes for consumption, non-financial income, portfolio weights, and net financial wealth be $C(t) = c$, $Y(t) = y$, $w(t) = w$, and $N(t) = n$. We use the same notation for the rate of return processes: $r(t) = r$, $\mu_s(t) = \mu_s$ and $\sigma_s(t) = \sigma_s$.

The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is a second order ODE in implicit form, for the value function $V(n)$,

$$\rho V(n) = \max_{c,w} \left\{ u(c) + V'(n)[(r(1 - w) + \mu_s w)n + y - c] + \frac{1}{2} w^2 n^2 (\sigma_s)^2 V''(n) \right\}. \quad (56)$$

The policy functions for consumption and portfolio composition, c^* and w^* , are obtained from the equations

$$u'(c^*) = V'(n), \quad (57)$$

$$w^* = \frac{1}{r_r(n)} \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{(\sigma_s)^2} \right) \quad (58)$$

where

$$r_r(n) = -\frac{v''(n)n}{v'(n)}, \quad \pi_r(n) = -\frac{v'''(n)n}{v''(n)}$$

are the coefficients of relative risk aversion and prudence for the value function, and $\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s}$ is the Sharpe index.

We obtain an explicit solution to the problem, if the utility function is isoelastic $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma}$.

In this case we conjecture that the solution for equation (56) is of the form

$$V(n) = x \left(\frac{A(n)^{1-\gamma} + \beta}{1-\gamma} \right)$$

where x and β are unknown constants, and

$$A(n) = \frac{y}{r} + n.$$

If the agent does not receive a non-financial income then $y = 0$ and $A(n) = n$, as in the frictionless finance economy in subsection 2.3. In both cases note that $A'(n) = 1$.

If the conjecture is correct, then $V'(n) = x(A(n))^{-\gamma}$, $V''(n) = -x\gamma(A(n))^{-(1+\gamma)}$, and $V'''(n) = x\gamma(1+\gamma)(A(n))^{-(2+\gamma)}$, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is

$$r_r(n) = \frac{\gamma n}{A(n)}.$$

Therefore, the optimal policy functions for consumption is

$$c^* = x^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} A(n)$$

and for the weight of the risky asset on net wealth is

$$w^* = \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{(\sigma_s)^2} \right) \frac{A(n)}{\gamma n}. \tag{59}$$

Substituting the trial function for $v(n)$ and optimal policies in the HJB equation (56), after some algebra yields

$$\frac{1 + \rho \beta x}{1 - \gamma} = x A(n)^{1-\gamma} \left(\frac{\rho}{\gamma - 1} + r + \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right)^2 + \frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma} x^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \right)$$

Setting to zero both sides of the equation, by solving to β the left hand side and to x the right hand side, we obtain

$$x = \left\{ \frac{\rho}{\gamma} + \left(\frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right) \left[r + \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right)^2 \right] \right\}^{-\gamma},$$

and $x\beta = -\frac{1}{\rho}$. Therefore,

$$v(n) = \left\{ \frac{\rho}{\gamma} + \left(\frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right) \left[r + \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right)^2 \right] \right\}^{-\gamma} \left(\frac{A(n)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \frac{1}{\rho(1-\gamma)} \right)$$

Therefore, the optimal policy for consumption, is obtained by substituting x , yielding

$$C^* = \left\{ \frac{\rho}{\gamma} + \left(\frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right) \left[r + \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right)^2 \right] \right\} A(N). \quad (60)$$

Therefore, the SDE for the optimal new wealth becomes, after substituting optimal consumption and portfolio policies, equations (60) and (59), in the budget constraint (55)

$$dN^* = \frac{A(N)}{\gamma} \left\{ \left[r - \rho + \frac{(1 + \gamma)}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right)^2 \right] dt + \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right) dW(t) \right\} \quad (61)$$

In the case of a logarithmic utility function we have:

$$w^* = \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s^2} \right) \frac{A(N)}{N} \quad (62a)$$

$$C^* = \rho A(N(t)) \quad (62b)$$

$$dN^* = A(N) \left\{ \left[r - \rho + \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right)^2 \right] dt + \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right) dW(t) \right\} \quad (62c)$$

If the agent does not receive non-financial income and has a logarithmic utility function the solution simplifies to

$$w^* = \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s^2} \right) \quad (63a)$$

$$C^* = \rho N(t) \quad (63b)$$

$$dN^* = N(t) \left\{ \left[r - \rho + \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right)^2 \right] dt + \left(\frac{\mu_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right) dW(t) \right\} \quad (63c)$$

References: Merton (1971), Merton (1990), Duffie (2001) and (Cvitanic and Zapatero, 2004, p. 395-398).

B.2 Solution by the stochastic Pontryagin maximum principle

Next we consider again the problem of maximizing the intertemporal utility functional (54) subject to the stochastic differential equation (55) where we assume there is no non-financial income, that is $Y(t) = 0$.

In this case there are two control variables, C and w , but one control variable, w , affects the volatility term. Because of the last fact we have to introduce two dynamic adjoint functions p and P and two static ones, q and Q .

The adjoint equations are

$$\begin{cases} dp(t) = - [r + (\mu - r)w(t)] p(t) + \sigma w(t)q(t) dt + q(t)dW(t) \\ \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} p(t) = 0 \end{cases}$$

and

$$\begin{cases} dP(t) = - [2(r + (\mu - r)w(t)) P(t) + (\sigma w(t))^2 P(t) + 2\sigma w(t)Q(t)] dt + Q(t)dW(t) \\ \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P(t) = 0. \end{cases}$$

To find the optimal controls we write the generalized Hamiltonian

$$G(t, N, C, w, p, P) = e^{-\rho t} \frac{C^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + p [(r + (\mu - r)w) N - C] + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 w^2 N^2 P$$

and

$$\mathcal{H}(t, N, C, w) = G(t, N, C, w, p, P) + \sigma w N (q - P \sigma w^* N).$$

The optimal controls, C^* and w^* are found by maximizing function $\mathcal{H}(t, N, C, w)$ for C and w . Therefore, we find

$$C^*(t) = e^{-\frac{\rho}{\gamma} t} p(t)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \tag{64}$$

and the condition

$$p(t)(\mu - r)N^*(t) + w^*(t)\sigma^2 N^*(t)^2 P(t) + \sigma N^*(t) (q(t) - \sigma w^*(t)N^*(t)P(t)) = 0$$

which is equivalent to $p(t)(\mu - r)N^*(t) + \sigma q(t)N^*(t) = 0$. Therefore we find

$$q(t) = -p(t) \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right),$$

and, substituting in the adjoint equation,

$$dp(t) = -p(t) \left(r dt + \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right) dW(t) \right).$$

Observe that the structure of the model is such that the shadow value of volatility functions P and Q have no effect in the shadow value functions associated with the drift component p and q , which simplifies the solution.

Applying the Itô's formula to consumption (64), and using this expression for the adjoint variable q , we find

$$\begin{aligned} dC(t) &= -\frac{\rho}{\gamma} C(t) dt - \frac{C(t)}{\gamma p(t)} dp(t) + \frac{(1 + \gamma)}{\gamma} \frac{C(t)}{p^2(t)} (dp(t))^2 = \\ &= -\frac{\rho C(t)}{\gamma} dt + \frac{C(t)}{\gamma} \left(r dt + \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right) dW(t) \right) + C(t) \frac{(1 + \gamma)}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right)^2 dt = \\ &= \frac{C(t)}{\gamma} \left\{ \left(r - \rho + \frac{(1 + \gamma)}{2} \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right)^2 \right) dt + \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right) dW(t) \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Now, we **conjecture** that consumption is a linear function of net wealth $C = \theta N$. If this is the case this would allow us to obtain the optimal portfolio composition w^* . If the conjecture is right then we will also have

$$\begin{aligned} dC(t) &= \theta dN(t) \\ &= \theta N(t) [(r + (\mu - r)w - \xi) dt + \sigma w dW(t)] \\ &= C(t) [(r + (\mu - r)w - \xi) dt + \sigma w dW(t)] \end{aligned}$$

This can only be consistent with the previous derivation if

$$\begin{cases} \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[r - \rho + \frac{(1 + \gamma)}{2} \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right)^2 \right] = r + (\mu - r)w - \theta \\ \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right) = \sigma w \end{cases}$$

Solving for θ and w we obtain the optimal controls

$$\begin{aligned} \theta &= \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[\rho + (\gamma - 1) \left(r + \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}_s - r}{\sigma_s} \right)^2 \right) \right] \\ w^* &= \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma^2} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Substituting in the budget constraint we have the optimal net wealth process

$$\frac{dN^*(t)}{N^*(t)} = \mu_n dt + \sigma_n dW(t)$$

where

$$\mu_n = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[r - \rho + \frac{(1 + \gamma)}{2\gamma} \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right)^2 \right] \quad (65)$$

$$\sigma_n = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left(\frac{\mu - r}{\sigma} \right) \quad (66)$$

which can be explicitly solved with the initial condition $N^*(0) = n_0$. We also find that

$$\frac{dC^*(t)}{C^*(t)} = \mu_n dt + \sigma_n dW(t)$$

the rates of return for consumption and wealth are perfectly correlated.

References (Yong and Zhou, 1999, chap. 3)

B.3 Solution by martingale representation methods

Suppose there is financial market with two assets, one risk-free asset with value B and one risky asset with value S following the processes $\{(B(t), S(t)), t \geq 0\}$ represented by

$$\begin{aligned} dB(t) &= r(t)B(t)dt, \quad B(0) = 1 \\ dS(t) &= \mu_s(t)S(t)dt + S(t)\sigma_s(t)dW(t), \quad S(0) = S_0. \end{aligned}$$

Then asset 1 is risk-free and asset 2 is risky.

We can show that $e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}S(t)$ **can be converted into a martingale**. Applying the Itô's lemma we get

$$\begin{aligned} d\left[e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}S(t)\right] &= S(t)d\left[e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}\right] + e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}dS(t) \\ &= e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}\left[-r(t)S(t)dt + \mu_s(t)S(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)S(t)dW(t)\right] \\ &= e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}\left[(\mu_s(t) - r(t))S(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)S(t)dW(t)\right]. \end{aligned}$$

If, in general $\mu_s(t) \neq r(t)$ then $e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}S(t)$ is not a martingale, with the initial probability distribution P . That is $\mathbb{E}^P\left[d\left[e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}S(t)\right]\right] \neq 0$

From the Girsanov theorem, we can find a \mathcal{F}_t -adapted process X_t and a new Wiener process $\tilde{W}(t)$ with probability measure Q and with density ξ_t relative to P , such that

$$dP(t) = \xi(t)dQ(t)$$

i.e., for which

$$\xi(t) = e^{\int_0^t X(s)dW(s) - \frac{1}{2}\int_0^t X(s)^2 ds}$$

with $\int_0^t X(s)^2 ds < \infty$, is a martingale. The new process is defined as

$$dW(t) = d\tilde{W}(t) - X(t)dt.$$

Applying that result we get

$$\begin{aligned} d\left[e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}S(t)\right] &= e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}\left[(\mu_s(t) - r(t))S(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)S(t)dW(t)\right] \\ &= e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}\left[(\mu_s(t) - r(t))S(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)S(t)\left(d\tilde{W}(t) - X(t)dt\right)\right] \\ &= e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}\left\{\left[\mu_s(t) - r(t) - \sigma_s(t)X(t)\right]S(t)dt + \sigma_s(t)S(t)d\tilde{W}(t)\right\} \\ &= e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}\sigma_s(t)S(t)d\tilde{W}(t). \end{aligned}$$

Then $\mathbb{E}^Q\left[d\left[e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}S(t)\right]\right] = 0$ if and only if

$$X(t) = \frac{\mu_s(t) - r(t)}{\sigma_s(t)}.$$

This process is called **market price of risk**.

For convenience, we rewrite the instantaneous budget constraint

$$dN(t) = \left\{ \left[r(t)(1 - w(t)) + \mu_s(t)w(t) \right] N(t) + Y(t) - C(t) \right\} dt + w(t)\sigma_s(t)N(t)dW(t),$$

and $N(0) = N_0$ and assume that $Y(t)$ follows equation (1) .

Consider the process

$$d\bar{M}(t) = -X(t)\bar{M}(t)dW(t)$$

also called in the literature the state density process, where $X(t)$ is the market price of risk. The process

$$M(t) = e^{-\int_0^t r(s)ds}\bar{M}(t)$$

is called the **state density deflator**. Using the Itô's lemma (prove this) it has the differential representation

$$dM(t) = -M(t) (r(t)dt + X(t)dW(t)) .$$

Now consider the deflated value of wealth defined as

$$Z(t) = M(t)N(t)$$

which is a \mathcal{F}_t -measurable. By using the Itô's lemma its differential representation is ⁷

$$dZ(t) = Z(t)[\sigma_s(t)w(t) - X(t)]dW(t) + M(t)(Y(t) - C(t))dt$$

then

$$Z(T) = Z(t) + \int_t^T M(s)(Y(s) - C(s))ds + \int_t^T Z(s)[\sigma_s(s)w(s) - X(s)]dW(s)$$

Under certain conditions, a **self-financing strategy** holds, i.e.,

$$E_t[Z(T)] = Z(t) + E_t \left[\int_t^T \bar{M}(s)(Y(s) - C(s))ds \right]$$

If we set $t = 0$ and take $T = \infty$ and assume that there are no bubbles

$$E_0[\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \bar{M}(t)N(t)] = N_0$$

⁷**Exercise:** prove this result by using the following version of the Itô's lemma: for $y = f(x_1, x_2)$

$$dy = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_1} dx_1 + \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_2} dx_2 + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_1^2} (dx_1)^2 + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_2^2} (dx_2)^2 + \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_1 \partial x_2} dx_1 dx_2.$$

then we get the intertemporal budget constraint as

$$E_0 \left[\int_0^{\infty} \bar{M}(s)(Y(s) - C(s))ds \right] = 0$$

which is formally identical to the restriction for the consumer problem in the Arrow-Debreu economy. This means that the state price deflator and the stochastic discount factor are equal.

An equivalent result would be obtained if the the household chose

$$w(t) = \frac{X(t)}{\sigma_s(t)},$$

which is the solution obtained by the other two methods.